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MARTHA MrNOW"
INTRODUCTION
I had to announce a title before I knew what I would say here, and I knew "question"
had to be in my title because my latest favorite saying is by James Thurber, who said, "It
is better to know some of the questions than all of the answers."'
There was also the aging law professor who, students noted, always asked the same
questions on the  exams,  year  after year. Finally  one year,  a student approached  the
professor before the exam and said, "Don't you know that we all know that you always
ask the  same questions and we find them out ahead of time?" To which the professor
replied, "Ah, that doesn't trouble me, because the questions are the same, but the answers
change."
So I'm opting for "questions" more than answers today. But I also mean to allude, with
my  title,  "The Constitution and the  Subgroup  Question,"  to the phrase,  "The Jewish
Question."
There are three references here. The first is the elephant joke: a number of people were
confronted with an elephant and asked to write a report. The Frenchman wrote about "The
Elephant and Its Loves"; the German wrote about "A Preliminary Investigation into the
Metaphysical  Implications  of the Elephant";  the  Englishman  wrote about "Hunting
Elephants in India";  the Indiana University law  school dean wrote about "The Global
Community  and  the  Elephant";  and the  Jew  wrote  "The  Elephant  and  the  Jewish
Question"--asking  whether the elephant is good or bad for the Jews.
Now, there is another version of the joke in which this last line is not about a Jew, but
an Irishman, who says, "The Elephant and the Irish Question"--at which point a Jewish
listener objects, "Hey, that's our elephant."  I like this version especially because it helps
to raise "the subgroup question" in general. How do issues of group identity and interests
arise  for the  variety  of subgroups  in this  country?  Does  each  subgroup  have  such
particular  and  unique  experiences,  paradoxically  rendering  problematic  even  their
grouping  together  as "subgroups"?  I  suggest so, and will emphasize the  need to pay
attention to particularity.2
At the same time, I do not want to lose the echoes of the phrase, "the Jewish question."
Karl Marx wrote a famous, perhaps notorious, essay entitled "On the Jewish Question."3
Some say it is evidence  of his  own anti-Semitism,  as he  associated the  problems  of
capitalism with Jews; but others suggest that it is a powerful exploration of the general
t  Presented on Nov. 18, 1994, Indiana University School of  Law-Bloomington as the 1994 Harris Lecture. The
Author thanks  Avi Soifer, Jody Freeman,  Vicky  Spelman, Frank Michelman,  Arnold Wolf, Carol Weisbrod, Susan
Williams, David Williams, Martha Field, Kate Bartlett, David Luban, David Wilkins, Lucie White, Christine Desan, Todd
Rakoff, Bruce Hay, Tom Kim, and Joe Singer for comments and suggestions, and Laurie Corzett, Katie Fallow and Lisa
Fishbayn for research assistance.
*  Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. JOHN BARTEIT,FAMnIAR  QUOTATIONS  831  (Emily M. Beck ed.,  15th ed. Little Brown & Co. 1980) (1855).
2.  Still another joke: An excited young boy announces to his family that "Babe Ruth hit another home run" The
boy's grandfather replies, "This Babe Ruth-is what he did good or bad for the Jews?"
3.  Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGEtS  READER 26 (Robert C. Tucker ed.,  W.W. Norton
& Co. 2d ed. 1978) (1843).INDIANA  LAW JOURNAL
tension or even contradiction  between  abstract citizenship  and membership  in private
subcommunities  like religions. As Marx put it, emancipation  of the Jews from second-
class status cannot be separated from human emancipation.  Human emancipation in turn
reqdires  separation of the  political state from  religion.  The emancipatory  ideal  thus
requires displacement  of religion from the state to civil society!  "The contradiction  in
which the adherent of a particular religion finds himself in relation to his citizenship is
only one aspect of the universal secular  contradiction  between the political  state and
civil society."5 Therefore, Marx rejected the view that the only emancipation possible for
Jews would require renouncing Judaism. He instead argued that Jews and all others must
join together to transform human nature.6 When viewed as a citizen,  each individual must
be released from the particularisms of religious identity and commitment.7  This general
claim  is indeed  what I mean to discuss here,  in the shadow of a third reference to the
Jewish question.
It was Hermann  Goering  in Nazi  Germany  who wrote,  "[S]ubmit  to me as soon as
possible a draft showing the..,  measures already taken for the execution of the intended
final solution of the Jewish question."8  In this country, we have never faced anything as
severe  as the "final  solution."  But Indians,  Blacks,  Chicanos, Japanese  and  Japanese-
American  West coast residents,  other immigrants,  people  with disabilities,  gays  and
lesbians, and women of all subgroups have experienced  official and unofficial exclusions
and  degradations  rendering  problematic  the  ostensible  promises  of  tolerance  and
pluralism. Subgroup identity therefore often seems to collide with the vision of abstract
citizenship. Notable conflicts arise between  groups and the state established to protect
individual freedoms, even though those individual freedoms specifically include freedom
of association.9
The "Constitution"  appears in my title as a promise that I will get around to the United
States  Constitution.  But  my  topic  is  deliberately  broader.  Since  their' beginning,
constitutions and democratic societies have posed problems for subgroups-pockets  of
people  who  seem  different  from  the  norm  or  the  majority.  It  is  true  that  liberal
constitutions  offer  opportunities;  but they  also  pose  problems  for  subgroups.  The
provisional South African Constitution, the Constitution  of India, and the constitutions
emerging in Eastern Europe all attest to this dilemma.
I hypothesize that these questions about the constitutional treatment of subgroups can
be illuminated by exploring the problem posed by Marx,  by attending to the perplexity
invited by the elephant story, and by remembering the highest possible stakes,  as in the
chilling reminder of Goering.  I restate it this way:  When must members of a subgroup
suppress their group affiliation to enjoy the benefits  accorded by the state?
4.  Id. at 35.
5.  Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
6.  Marx asserted:
Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the
abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday  life, in his work, and in his relationships,  he
has become a species-being,  and when he has recognized  and organized his own  powers (forces propres)
as social powers so that he no longer separates this social  power from himself as political  power.
Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
7.  Marx claimed that securing the individual right of religious freedom as a civil right would only perpetuate a
Christian state. Id. at 42-46.
8.  WILUAM L. SHiRER, THE RisE AND  FALL OF THE THIRD  REICH, 964 (1962)  (emphasis in original) (quoting
instructions sent from Reich Marshall Hermann  Goering to S.S.  Security Service Chief Reinhard  Heydrich on July 31,
1941).
9.  For a superb treatment of these issues,  see AvIAM SOIFER, LAW  AND THE COMPANY  WE KEEP (1995).
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Religious subgroups  pose special  issues under a constitution  devoted both  to free
exercise of religion and to avoiding the establishment of religion. But analogous issues
arise  for  other  groups.  May  people  exercise  their  freedom  of association  without
jeopardizing other legal protections? May people  claim rights  of full inclusion  in the
society without giving up their identities as members of ethnic and racial subgroups? May
people with disabilities obtain access  to mainstream institutions without jeopardizing
claims to special accommodations?
Therefore, where religious subgroups are at issue, my question can be cast this way:
Does the secular,  democratic state require assimilation as the price of membership?  Is
separatism the only option for those who wish to preserve their group-based identity? 0
With these concerns in mind, a recent case decided by the Supreme  Court begs  for
attention. This is Board  of  Education of  Kiryas Joel Village School District  v. Grumet."
You may know it as the Hasidic community school's case-the Supreme  Court struck
down  a state statute creating  a special  school  district used to set up a school  for the
disabled children in a village in upstate New York composed entirely of ultra-orthodox
Jews.  Issues of religious,  linguistic,  and  cultural  identity  animated  the  community's
desire for the  school.  Yet the parents  and the community  also  invoked the rights  of
students with disabilities to a free, appropriate public education.
My method for analyzing the case reveals my hypothesis about how to deal with the
tension between a general constitutional scheme and the special claims of a subgroup: we
all  need  to  hear the  claims of the subgroup  from its  perspective,  but  also  from the
perspective  of outside  observers.  Further,  we  need  to  explore  how  individuals  and
members  of  contrasting  groups  can  live  together  under  one  constitutional  scheme
committed to both liberty and equality. And we need to keep vivid and vocal the tensions
between and  among these perspectives so that no one of them succeeds in permanently
defeating the others.
Thus,  I  will offer two  frames for analysis.  The first is  a narrative  of particularity:
sketching the history of the subgroup as understood by members of the subgroup and a
description of Kiryas Joel's claims tempered by the observations of outsiders. I will use
this frame to offer an analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of the controversy. Then
I will reframe  the issue by exploring the contrasting  public commitment to inclusion
developed  by social  movements seeking  equality under the  law. The commitment to
inclusion offers a contrasting vantage point to consider not only the case of Kiryas Joel's
school district, but also the larger issues that subgroups raise for the political order. The
two frames-particularity  and inclusion-by themselves and by their joint consideration
introduce tensions that underscore the subgroup question. It is less my purpose to resolve
than to illuminate the question.
10.  Or does the secular commitment to preserving spheres of private, religious freedom itself  threaten  the secular
state and its guarantee of  universal  equality  and liberty? Do many pockets of separateness jeopardize the liberal state?
Does a fhilure to emancipate the state from religion leave so much of Christianity imbuing public life that non-Christians
in particular remain excluded from liberty and equality?
11.  114 S.  Ct. 2481  (1994).
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I. NARRATIVE  OF PARTICULARITY
Of course as long as there has been a Diaspora-the dispersion of Jews from Palestine
after the destruction of the Second Temple nearly two thousand years ago'l--there  has
been the Jewish question: how can the Jews survive as a nation within other nations?
Christians  have  had the  same problem  when  they were (and  where they are today)
minorities within a state. That was the context for the classic response to the problem  in
Mark 12:17: "Render  unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's."
For Jews, devising a way to relate to Caesar, or Napoleon,  has remained  a persistent
issue. In Babylonia, and in medieval Europe, Jews and the governing authorities  often
devised a truce of sorts and the authorities granted the Jews relative autonomy. These
societies  were  accustomed to groupings or to feudal structures.  In addition,  Christian
doctrine required some degree of respect for Judaism,  even if the Christian view deemed
Judaism  an inferior religion. 3  With regard to domestic  legal affairs, such  as religion,
education,  family  law, economic  regulation,  and civil  litigation, the Jews  were  often
granted substantial control over their conduct. 4 As kings consolidated their power in the
Middle Ages, 5  they treated Jews as chattels,  denied the rights of free men but assured
protection by the king from  interference by the king's vassals-an early example of a
domestic  choice of law rule.'6  In 13th-century  England, the king devised a tribunal to
manage his transactions with Jews and to resolve disputes with the use of mixed Christian
and Jewish juries-unless the dispute arose between two Jews, and then could be left to
a Jewish tribunal.'
7
From the vantage point of Jewish law, the rule that emerged was similar: that the Law
of the kingdom is the Law. From the perspective  of the Jews,  however, this rule meant
something  quite different  from what the kings meant.  The Jews  claimed  the power to
interpret the boundary between state and religion.'"  Recognition  of the king's law was
treated  not as  submission  to a superior authority,  but instead  as acknowledgment  of
"foreign  law" specified and permitted by Jewish law.'9
Jewish authorities thereby interpreted Jewish law to require compliance with basic tax
laws, but also to permit resistance. They did this, especially, through the technique  of
considering the law of the kingdom to mean traditional, customary  law, rather than any
12.  15 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA  1168 (1971)  (Flavius Vespanius Titus, Emperor of Rome,  destroyed the Second
Temple in 70 C.E.).
13.  NAOMI  W. COHEN, JEWS IN  CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY  11 (1992).
14.  Id Rabbinical courts in theory retained only power over religious matters, yet Judaism made no clear distinction
between  religious and secular spheres, and therefore medieval European  rabbinical  courts routinely handled commercial,
family, criminal, and other disputes. JEROLD S. AUERBACH,  JUSTICE WITHOtr LAW? 77-78 (1983).
15.  See CHARLESREmBAt,  THELAWOFTHELAND: THEEVOLunON  OF OURLEGAL SYSTEM 134-35  (1980).Kings
declared that the law of the land governed the Jews, but the kings still accorded them specific  grants of  autonomy. See also
COHEN, supra note  13, at 11.
16.  Shael Herman, Legacy and Legend.  The Continuity of  Roman and English Regulation of  the Jews, 66 TUL.  L.
REV. 1781,  1804 (1992).
17.  MARIANNE  CONSTABLE,  THE LAW  OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED  JURY AND  CHANGING  CONCEPTIONS  OF
CITIZENSHIP,  LAW, AND  KNOWLEDGE  20-21  (1994).
18.  The boundary between state and religion is monitored in Jewish law through the notion of  Dina  de-malkhuta
Dina:  the Law of the kingdom is the Law. See generally GIL GRAFF, SEPARATION  OF CHURCH AND STATE:  DINA DE-
MALXHuA  DINA IN JEWISH LAW,  1750-1848  (1985).
19.  Jewish  law directs  respect  for the  king's laws, but the boundary  is  interpreted by  the  Jews as  a limited
recognition of"foreign law" based upon the authority of Jewish law. Id. at 10.
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new law invented by a sovereign. This permitted Jewish objections to a particular king's
imposition of new, onerous taxes.
Rulers often granted Jews permission through specific charters to live according to
their own  laws, to engage in trade  and some other businesses,  and thus to create  the
revenues that could be taxed. For the most part, community integrity was not an issue.
Jews had no option of integration or acceptance  in the rest of the society.
It may seem paradoxical,  but in retrospect, the period before the invention of liberal,
secular  constitutions  granted  Jewish  communities  relative  stability  and
autonomy-except,  of course, when interrupted by pogroms, periodic expulsions, and
mass slaughters such as those occasioned by the Crusades. One observer described this
paradox in these terms:
Despite abuses of power on the part of communal  leaders, an  autonomous, tradition-
bound kahal  [community] provided psychological sustenance to its members,  sheltered
their existence, and nurtured collective Jewish survival. It is no wonder that, when faced
later with the  reality of Jewish  emancipation,  some  Jewish  leaders  feared  that  the
attendant abolition of the legal community was too high a price to pay.2 "
As medieval  kings grew more powerful and won the approval of the Pope and other
clerical authorities, they used their sovereignty to displace customary  law in the name of
Christianity. This caused greater difficulties for the Jews and prompted mass emigrations
to the East. The plague also contributed to mass migrations. So did the expulsions from
England in 1290  and from Spain in 1492.
Further disruption occurred  in the 16th century with the beginning of Protestantism.
The revolt by Martin Luther and other Protestants  in the  16th century had the unintended
effect of advancing  secularism in Europe. The Protestant Revolution displaced the one
dominant religion with many religious views and groups. The challenge for governments
everywhere became how to maintain order without doing constant battle over religion.
One  technique depended  upon and  strengthened  emerging  nationalism.  The Peace  of
Augsburg  of 1555,  for example,  resolved that the  faith of the monarch  would be the
official  faith  of the  realm  and its  citizens.2'  When  varieties  of Protestants  began to
challenge the dominance of Catholicism, however, Jews and Moslems were no longer the
only heretics.
Order  fell,  however,  before  the  religious  wars  of the  17th  century.  Bloody  and
tumultuous, the wars convinced many that no single religion would ultimately prevail and
therefore leaders ushered in an era of greater tolerance. At the same time, the tight order
of feudal society broke down. Growing conceptions of a secular state relied on positive
law  and eroded  earlier notions  of community-based  norms.  these changes  corroded
respect for Jewish  communal autonomy and rabbinic court power. From without, the
Jewish  community  faced reductions  of the privileges of autonomy;  from within, the
Jewish communities confronted declining  commitments to separatism. More Jews moved
to cities and participated in the Industrial Revolution, with experiences then of working
side-by-side with non-Jews.
The general secularization  of society permitted many Jews and Christians to meet on
neutral  ground. The ideas of the Enlightenment justified this  common ground on the
theory that all men  have reason  and access to truth,  unaffected by class or  religious
20.  COHEN, supranote 13, at 11.
21.  SANFORD  H. COBB,  THE RIsE OF RELIGIOUS  LiEatTY IN AMERICA: A HIsToRY  49 (1968);  THE OxFORD
DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH  108 (F.L. Cross &  E.A.  Livingstone eds.,  2d ed. 1983).
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distinction. Thus, Jews who accepted this program could themselves  be accepted.  But
what would it mean to "sign  on to the program"? This crystallizes my question: How are
Jews  to  live  in  a world  that  offers  equality  and  freedom  if the  Jews  would  simply
assimilate?
Spinoza faced excommunication for his answer in the 1650's. He advised keeping the
natural law as divine, but in recognizing its universality and giving up the ceremonial
law, he designed to convert Hebrew  slaves into an obedient body politic in  a defunct
kingdom  of  Israel.
22  A  more  popular  answer  within  Jewish  circles  appeared  in
formulations  by  Moses  Mendelssohn.  Mendelssohn  argued  that  the modern  state  is
compatible with Judaism.  He counseled Jews to "devote yourselves  to the constitution
of the  land  in  which  you  have  settled,  but  remain  steadfast  in  the religion  of your
fathers."'
Now  it was the very  Jewish-looking  Moses Mendelssohn  who  inspired this  classic
story. Mendelssohn  was walking down a busy street in  Berlin, where he  accidentally
bumped  into  a  large  Prussian  officer-who  erupted  angrily,  saying,  "Swine!"
Mendelssohn returned with a courtly bow, replying, "Mendelssohn."24
What is this story about?  Is it a parody of what happens when a subgroup adopts the
mores of the majority? A bittersweet  commentary  on  what happens  when  a despised
group claims equality,  while retaining identity? Perhaps the story foreshadows by  150
years what happened in Berlin under the Nazis.
In Mendelssohn's  still-hopeful era of the late 18th century, ideals of freedom, equality,
and fraternity brewed and spilled into the French and American revolutions. Unanswered
then, and unanswered today, are questions about what the promise of liberal constitutions
should mean for the Jews, especially  in three areas:
1. The education of children. Should the state be able to compel participation  in state-
directed education?  Should any  group, like the Jews,  be able to seclude their children
from secular,  state-run education?  Should education  aim to prepare young people  for
participation in the larger polity or should it seek to preserve distinctive traditions? Does
the  effort  to  do  both  risk  doing  neither?  Christians  for centuries  have  argued  that
exposing Jews to Western civilization will lead to an abandonment of Jewish ways and
to conversion.  Have they been right or wrong?
2. Family law. Should the state be in charge of the rules governing  entrance into and
exit from families through marriage, divorce,  and adoption? Should the state control the
definition  of family  obligations  and  prerogatives  and  take  charge  of  the  care  of
dependents, those who cannot care for themselves? If not, should a religious group be
able entirely to control such intimate matters, even if some of its members would like to
opt out and to use secular rules? This is an issue in Israel today. A thriving industry helps
Israelis travel outside the country when they wish to be married  beyond the control  of
religious law. There is also a great problem for women who have not obtained religious
divorces and yet wish to remarry. This becomes a question of gender equality when the
secular state offers different guarantees  from what the religious one accords. Consider,
22.  See also COHEN,  supra note 13, at  12 (stating that Spinoza recommended  "a national ...  rational and ethical
religion, which the state would translate into positive law").
23.  MOSES MENDELSSOHN,  JERUSALEM (1783), reprinted in A TREASURY OF JEWISH QUoTATIONS  89 (Joseph L.
Baron ed. 1985).
24.  THE BIG BOOK OF JEWISH HUMOR 82 (William  Novak&  Moshe Waldoks eds., 1981).
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as another example, the choices of state versus family control of domestic violence that
Orthodox Jewish women face in the United States.
3. Religious accommodation versus neutrality  in public settings. Should a subgroup be
able to secure special treatment when its members serve in the military or elsewhere in
the government? When does accommodation  become inconsistent with the government's
commitment to neutrality concerning religion? Should Jews demand an entirely neutral
government and oppose  the use  of prayer at the beginning  of a legislative  session  or
during a public high school graduation ceremony-or, instead, should Jews seek periodic
rotation of Jewish clergy alongside  a full array of leaders of other religions?  Can Jews
who  serve  in the military  disobey the requirement  of wearing  a specified  uniform  by
wearing  yarmulkes? Our  Supreme Court said  "no,"  but Congress stepped  in and said
"yes."
As sovereignty has passed from kings to the people, the Jewish community has also
been transformed from the Other to individuals of the Mosaic persuasion, individuals like
everyone else. This only poses the Jewish question still more starkly: Can integration of
the Jews into the common world of citizens be compatible with retaining adherence to the
law of Moses and with Jewish communal autonomy?
The  French  Revolution  put  this  question  sharply.  As  part  of the  revolutionary
commitment to equality,  France specifically offered  citizenship to its Jews if they met
.certain  conditions,  took  civic  oaths,  canceled  exemptions  from  general  rules  and
obligations, and relinquished privileges of community autonomy.
One Jewish leader of this period,  Berr-Isaac-Berr de Turique, wrote to his brethren in
Lorraine and proclaimed that the Jews must "divest [them]selves  entirely of that narrow
spirit, of corporation and Congregation, in all civil and political matters, not immediately
co'nnected with our spiritual laws,  in these things we must absolutely appear simply as
individuals, as Frenchmen."'
Under Napoleon, Jews in France faced the loss of  their newly gained citizenship unless
they could reconcile their religious beliefs with their duties as members of the French
polity. Official pressure produced rabbinic rulings finding religious authority permitting
Jewish soldiers to eat legumes during Passover. In the United States, beginning  in the
1830's, groups of Jews  advocated changing Sabbath observance to Sunday in order to
avoid conflict with the prevailing Sunday laws.
26
Does the relatively tolerant and open setting of Franceexplain why the Dreyfus Affair
erupted in 1794? The court martial and banishment  and then the trial and retrial revealed
how even a Jew who assimilated in all notable respects, who attended French schools and
served  as  a career  officer in  the French  army,  risked  anti-Semitic  attack. The  event
foreshadowed the Nazi era's final solution of extermination that treated genealogy  as the
key aspect  of identity. After these events,  many Jews  concluded that assimilation  is
illusory and destructive to the Jews.
Jewish groups who tell their history are likely to cast their eyes on this trail of crises
and still feel  beleaguered. Contemporary  Jews know that Jews for centuries have lived
25. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg & David N. Myers, Conmunity, Constitution  ad Culture: The Case ofthe  Jewish
Kehilah,  25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 633, 643.44 (1992) (quoting letter from Berr-Isaac-Berr to the Jews of France (1791),
translated  in  FROM EXPULSION TO EMANCIPATION:  TEXT AND  DOCUMENTS  ON JEWISH RIGHTS  16TH - 18ITH CENTuIuEs
141  (YosefH. Yerushaimi ed.) (collection of photocopied sources for use in courses at Columbia University)).
26.  MORTON BORDEN, JEws, TURKS,  AND INFIDELS  110(1984).
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as minorities within non-Jewish nations and asked: How much accommodation  should
occur from the Jewish side? How much from the side of the state?
This reminds me of  this story from the Talmud, the rabbis'  commentaries on the Bible:
Caesar said to Rabbi Tanhum, "Come let us become one people."
Rabbi Tanhum replied, "By my life, we who are  circumcised cannot be like you.
You, then, should become circumcised  and be like us."
"A  very good answer,"  Caesar  replied, "unfortunately,  anyone  who defeats  the
Emperor in an argument must be thrown to the lions." So they threw Rabbi Tanhum to
the lions. But the lions did not eat him.
An unbeliever, who was standing nearby, said, "The reason the lions do not eat him
is that they are not hungry."
To test this theory, they threw the unbeliever to the lions, who ate him.27
We are probably meant to think that the lions got it right. One thing they, .and Rabbi
Tanhum, got especially right is that neutrality is impossible given the relation between
religion and politics. Simply calling for neutrality by the state does not tell us what the
starting  point  is:  Is  the  starting point  a position  compatible  with  or  antagonistic  to
religion?  Consider  such  neutral-sounding  rules  as:  no  one  may  get  unemployment
benefits who lost ajob due to drug use; and no one may get unemployment benefits who
was fired for any reason  at all. If the drug use in question was ritual use of peyote under
religious  auspices2-- or  if  the  employee  was  fired  for  refusing  to  work  on  her
Sabbath 29 -- the rules no longer seem neutral.
The state must not be neutral, in the sense of doing nothing to accommodate those with
religious  beliefs,  where  the  state's  own  starting  point  excludes  or  burdens  them.
Otherwise,  anyone with  religious beliefs  simply must dispense with them in  order to
operate in the secular, public sphere.
From  this  vantage  point,  some-but  far  from  all-observant  Jews  resist
accommodating the state, and ask instead how the state can accommodate religion. This
historical narrative reveals some of the views held by residents of the Village of Kiryas
Joel  whose recent Supreme Court case deserves  interpretation in light of the historical
narrative I have offered.
III. BOARD OF EDUCATION OFKIRYAS JOEL VILLAGE SCHOOL
DISTRICT V. GRUMET
How can  "the  story"  of a dispute be  told  given the  fact that its  participants  have
different and conflicting perspectives?  When a group's experiences  are reported, familiar
questions  about  who  may  speak  for  whom  and  how  multiple  experiences  can  be
summarized can  and should surface. These difficulties become  especially pronounced
when  the  dispute  moves  through  the  adversarial  legal  system,  further  polarizing
participants and their supporters. Nonetheless, a story  can be constructed through the
points of convergence in the narratives of opposing sides and through efforts to honestly
report the points of divergence.  No doubt, the story will be incomplete  and will inspire
revisions or new stories. However, in my view, that is a strength of  the use of stories, not
27.  TH  BIGBOOK OF JEWISH HUMOR, supra  note 24, at 84 (quoting Sanhedrin 39a). Assuming the unbeliever is
supposed to be a Jew, the story says something about divisions within as well as divisions without.
28.  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29.  Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.  136 (1987).
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a weakness. These features of stories help to reveal the significance of perspectives to
efforts  to make  sense  of experience,  while  also  inviting  elaboration,  rejoinder,  and
conversation.
So, here is a provisional story of the case of Board of  Education of  Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet
0  presented both from the perspective of the Satmar Hasidim
and from the views of some outside observers, including opponents in the litigation and
critics more generally.
When the story began would itself be a likely subject for dispute, depending on which
side is consulted. Did it start when residents of the Village of Kiryas Joel successfully
pressed the New York State Legislature to adopt a statute that created a school district for
the village which is composed entirely of followers of Satmar Hasidim? Or did it start
when a group of Satmar Hasidim,  a group of ultra-Orthodox Jews, moved to upstate New
York and faced charges of zoning  violations in the city of Monroe?  The Satmar used
housing in ways that reflected their close-knit group practices and prior experiences  of
highly dense urban living. They ultimately  avoided the zoning issue by seeking, gaining,
and defending incorporation as a separate local government under New York law.3'
Members of the Satmar community would probably say that the story began with the
history of the Jews, or at least with the history of the Teitelbaum family leadership of a
sect of Hasidic Jews in Hungary in the  19th century.32  Emerging in hostile, non-Jewish
settings, this Orthodox sect subscribed in Europe, and then in the United States, to the
idea that the Law of the land is the Law-but only as a choice of law rule within Jewish
law.33 The Satmar are the largest, most traditional Hasidic community. They established
themselves in the United States to honor the memory of those murdered in the Holocaust
by recreating separate communities resembling the Eastern European villages that the
survivors fled after World War IIM The community has resisted the assimilation offered
by  modern  secular  Europe,  and promoted  by the  economic  and  civic opportunities
afforded  in the United  States. The Satmar view the United States  as a government of
grace which  is just and kindly disposed to them,  but which is also  a threat due to the
larger society's lures and lawlessness."
The Satmar believe that "[t]he Torah forbids the new."36 They transported their way  of
life from Hungary to Brooklyn, and then some moved to what became Kiryas Joel. They
speak Yiddish; they dress in clothes more typical of medieval communities than late 20th-
century America;  they segregate the  sexes  outside the home;  they eschew  television,
radio, and English-language publications.37
30.  114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
31.  The incorporation  followed  the procedures established by  state law. 114  S.  Ct. 2481,  2485-87  (1994).  The
procedure involved no substantive review of  the justifications for or desirability of a newly incorporated town. Indeed,
the supervisor who approved the petition did so with regret about the lack of authority for a substantive basis for review
and criticized the incorporation as a misuse of incorporation to bypass the intense and litigated conflict over the Satmar's
zoning violations. In re Formation of a  New Village to be Known as 'Kiryas  Joel,'  Supervisor, Town of Monroe, Orange
County, New York, (Decision on  Sufficiency Petition), Dec. 10, 1976, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 15-16, Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Gromet,  114 S.  Ct. 2481 (1994)  (No. 93-517)  (challenging the validity of  the village
incorporation petition). The supervisor also treated claims by the Satmar ofreligious persecution as spurious.
32.  ISRAEL RUBIN, SATmAR: ANISLANDINTHE  CrrY 28(1972).
33.  Allan L. Nadier, Piety andPolitics:  The Case of  the SatmarRebbe,  31 JUDAISM  135,  145 (1982).
34.  JEROME R. MINZ, HASIDIC PEOPLE: A PLACEsINTHENEW WORLD 29 (1992).
35.  RUBIN,  supra note 32, at 171.
36.  Id at 152.
37.  WILLIAMM.KEPHART&WILIAMW.  ZELLNER, EXTRAORDINARY  GROUPS  161-75 (4th ed.  1991).
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The Satmar community educates its children in private, single-sex religious schools.
The disabled children in the community, however, are entitled under federal and state law
to special educational services using public funds."t  Briefly during the mid-1980's, those
services were provided by the state in the religious schools, but Supreme Court decisions
announced at the time forbade the provision of such direct public services on the site of
religious  schools. 39  Some of the  parents of disabled Hasidic  children then  sent their
children to the public schools in the next town,4  but found it unacceptable because of the
"panic, fear and trauma" experienced by children sent away from their community to be
with people so different.4'  Some of the parents had challenged the provision of services
in the public schools as inadequate and insensitive to the needs of their children.42
At  the  request  and  urging  of residents  of Kiryas  Joel,  the  New  York legislature
authorized the Village of Kiryas Joel to establish public schools. The village exercised
this authority solely for disabled students since the Satmar Hasidim in the village had no
interest in any other public schools. Citizen taxpayers and the New York School Board
Association sued, claiming that the statute creating this special  school district was not
neutral  and violated the requirement to separate church and state mandated  by the First
Amendment.
4 3 Viewed in this way,  the case presents a problem  squarely within all three
questions left unanswered by the history of Jews in Western constitutional societies: the
education  of  children,  the  governance  of families  and  care  of dependents,  and  the
acceptable  degree of accommodation of religion in public settings.
It may  well  be  that the  Hasidic  community  had  complex  motives.  Many  outside
observers think that the Satmar are a contentious and difficult group, with authoritarian
rabbis, internal schisms, and a willingness to use devious tactics of appeasement, bribery,
38.28 U.S.C.  §§  1400-1402, 1404,  1409, 1411-1414  (Supp. V 1993); N.Y.  EDUC. LAW §§ 4004-4005 (McKinney
1995).
39.  A set of cases forbids state aid to parochial schools and even the provision ofstate  services, such as publicly
funded services for students with disadvantaged backgrounds  or with disabilities, on the grounds of parochial schools. In
1985, the Court ruled that public services such as remedial programs for disadvantaged  students cannot be provided by
employees of public schools on parochial school property. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).  The Court similarly
ruled in 1977 that although diagnostic services would be permissible on the site of a religious school, therapeutic and
remedial services could only be provided on a neutral site off the premises of  a sectarian  institution. Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S.  229 (1977).
In contrast, in  1993 the Court found no constitutional bar to the provision of a sign language interpreter for a deaf
student who attended a parochial school. The Court reasoned that this public provision of a service defrayed  none of  the
usual costs of  the parochial school, nor did the interpreter participate in the actual instruction of the student. Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Seh. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462  (1993).
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 114 S.  Ct.
2481, 2497 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concuning), suggested reconsideringAguilarand  Wolman.  See infra text accompanying
notes 63-65. There may be reasons to support this view apart from obviating the motive for the statute at issue in Kiryas
Joel.  I will suggest, however, that problematic as it is, the statute affords a greater  chance for connecting an insular
religious community to others in society.
40.  Some of the parents had tried this option in the neighboring Monroe-Woodbury  school  district. Earlier, the
Satmar community had used an annex to the religious school for delivering special  education services, but this use of
public funds was forbidden by Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1980's. See supra note 39 and accompanying  text.
41.  Kiryas Joel, 114 S.  Ct. at 2495.
42.  This claim animated the lawsuit that became Monroe-Woodbury Central  School District v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d
767 (N.Y.  1988) (alleging inadequate one-on-one services). In addition, some of the parents claimed that their children's
language  needs were not met. See  Affidavit of Abraham  Wieder in Support of Motion to Intervene,  app. H at 127a,
Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Grumet,  114 S. Ct. 1046 (1994)  (No. 93-539).
43.  The First Amendment to the Constitution combines a commitment to separate church and state and a guarantee
to individuals that they remain free to exercise their own religion. These two goals often seem to conflict. An individual
may ask the government to devise a special accommodation  to permit free exercise of religion, but then the government
faces objections that such an accommodation favors that religion,  or favors religion over no religion.  This tension has
produced a variety of resolutions. See generally LAURENCEH.  TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTUrIONAL LAW  §§ 14-4 to 14-5,
at J1166-79 (2d ed.  1988).THE SUBGROUP QUESTION
and  manipulation.
4  Some outside  observers  also  argue that  the Satmar  never really
wanted a public school; that instead, they wanted the state to pay for a private school,
entirely segregated from the rest of the world.
4
1
There is evidence outside the court record  of preferences for self-segregation  by the
community.  One Satmar residing in New York City was quoted as saying: "If we have
our kids learning with [others], they'll be corrupted. We don't hate these people, but we
don't like them. We want to be separate. It's intentional." 6  Jerome Mintz quotes another
Satmar from Williamsburg, New York who said:
If you raise a child for eighteen years, sacrifice and sweat blood, and someone comes
along and tries to influence them in a different way from yours, what would you do?...
Our community is built on religion. You can't understand it with your mind. It's more
important than any other thing.'
Significantly, this defense of separatism was offered to defend the Satmar against another
Hasidic group, the Lubavitch. Indeed, this particular statement was offered in defense of
Satmars  in Williamsburg  who  assaulted  a Lubavitch  rabbi for offering  lessons to an
eighteen-year-old  Satmar. This certainly portrays  a vivid sensibility of the outside world
as a threat, and the inside world as very particular to the Satmar Hasidic community."'
Yet  "separatism"  is  not  an  accurate  way  to  describe the  Satmar,  who  engage  in
commercial activities, such as the diamond industry, both in New York as well as in the
rest of the world. In court, on the record, the Satmars emphasized that separatism  is not
a tenet of faith. Before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Satmar specifically
disputed the plaintiffs'  claim that the Satmar faith requires its adherents not to mix with
persons of other faiths. 49 The brief for the Satmars stated: "While we have never disputed
that  the  Satmar  prefer to  live together,  they  do  so to  facilitate  individual  religious
observance and maintain  social, cultural,  and religious values, not because it is 'against
their religion'  to interact with others.""  One Hasidic observer notes that ambivalence
about America leads them to threaten or bristle for fear that friendships with outsiders
could undermine their separatism.5'
Moreover, whatever views toward separatism some members of the community may
hold,  the  community  did request  authorization  for a public school.  Furthermore,  the
school they set up was administered by people from outside the community and offered
44. See, e.g., Nadler, supra  note 33, at 145-47. Viewers of CNN may have acquired their own evidence on such
matters while the case was pending. As the case was argued in the Supreme Court, members of  the Satmar community
vied for the opportunity to speak with reporters about fights internal to the community as well as views about the case.
Oral tradition among the New York Jewish community also reflects these views of  the Satmar. The story is told of one
group of Satmar who, during a battle over incorporation of another village, were able to convince the Presiding Judge  that
they were patriotic Americans by naming their streets after U.S. Presidents. Daniel D. Alexander, Political Influence of
the Resident Hasidic Community on the East Ramapo Central School District 48 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University).
45.  Suzanne Fields, Public School District  forSect Denied,  ATLANTA  J. & CONSr., June 30, 1994, at A2.
46.  Parents' Ass'n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones,  803 F.2d 1235, 1238 (2d Cir. 1986) (recounting quotation from media
coverage of the case).
47.  MINTZ, supra  note 34, at 162.
48.  A joke circulated within other Jewish  communities about the Satmar conveys another side of  this story-the
picture of  the Satmar as self-righteous fanatics: a Satmar rebbe dies and goes to Heaven where the angels offer him a meal.
The rebbe says, "Excuse me, who said this food is kosher?" "God himself," answers an angel. "H1mm,  very interesting,
could I maybe have a salad?" replies the rebbe (to avoid eating anything that is not kosher).
49.  Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.l, Board ofEdue. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481
(1994)  (N  o. 93-517) ('The record does not support this contention, and it is wrong as a matter offact.").
50.  Id
5  1. ALEXANDER,  supra  note 44, at 52 (citing Hasidic  informant).
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entirely  secular  instruction  by  teachers  from  outside  the  community 2  The
superintendent, who has direct control over the school, is a person with twenty years of
experience  in the  field of bilingual/bicultural education  in the New York  City public
schools-and a person who, himself, is not Hasidic. 3
No religious instruction occurred at the school. Moreover, as evidence that the Satmar
did mean to seek public education, the school is co-ed, despite the religiously mandated
sex segregation in the religious schools.54
In  its lawsuit, the New York  School Board  Association claimed  that it was not the
school per se, but its creation by the state which violated the Establishment Clause. As
it turns  out, the majority of the organized  Jewish community,  and most Jews I  know,
agreed with this position and disagree with the creation of the special district for Kiryas
Joel. In amici briefs filed with the Supreme Court, representatives of  the Orthodox Jewish
community  supported  Kiryas  Joel,  but all other  Jewish groups-and  500 citizens  of
Kiryas Joel itself-opposed the special school district on constitutional grounds.55
The  amicus briefs are filled with learned  analyses of the Supreme  Court's  religion
clause cases. Looking behind them, however, to ask why most organized Jewish groups
opposed Kiryas Joel, again illuminates the subgroup question.
A deeply religious Jewish professor suggested to me that the Satmar should not ask for
special education  from the state, but should  instead take care of their own,  and secure
their independence.  Other Jews might worry that accommodating members of the Kiryas
Joel  community  could  unleash  Christian  animosity  toward  all  Jews.  Even  if
accommodation helps in the short run, in the long run it breeds jealousy and resentment.
Some may even fear that non-Jews will think that all Jews are like the Satmar: bearded,
intense,  antisecular,  and rigid. Others  may fear that letting  pro-Jewish  legislation  go
forward will prompt a backlash against religious Jews or Jews in general.
In  the long  run,  permitting  the special  school district  could have further negative
results for Jews, including the Satmars. Accommodation of this Hasidic community  could
lead  to accommodation  of other fundamentalist groups-and  the others might not be
Jews.  This  prospect threatens  the liberal,  secular  state with takeover  by  enclaves  of
illiberal,  fervently  religious  groups.  In  an  era  of growing  Christian fundamentalist
political movements, these are not imaginary worries. For many Jews,  the commitment
to separate church  and state is so basic a precondition for freedom from state-sponsored
oppression  that  the  analysis  stops  there.  Anything  that  smacks  of state-sponsored
52.  Telephone Interview with Nathan  Lewin, Counsel for Kiryas Joel (Nov. 4,  1994).
53.  Affidavit ofSteven M. Benardo, app. J at 115-17a, Board ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 544  (1993) (No. 93-517).
54.  Brief for the Petitioner at 4 n.1,  Kiryas  Joel  (No. 93-517).  Consistent with their view that religious law is
central, the Satmar also argued that their acceptance of co-education  for disabled children  is permitted by "Satmar religious
observance." Id This convenient answer to some may raise questions about sincerity, as did the change in Church policy
following the Supreme Court's decision  in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)  (refusing a tax
exemption  to a religious institution that discriminated on the basis of race).
55.  Siding with  Kiryas Joel Village School  District were Agudath  Israel of America  and other advocates  for
Orthodox Jewish groups, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, and a variety of other Christian  groups. Siding
against them were  the American Jewish  Congress, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the American Jewish
Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the National Council of Jewish Women, People for the American Way, a variety
of other religious groups, groups committed to the separation of  church and state, and teachers'  unions. The opposition
also included 500 members of the Committee for the Well-Being of Kiryas Joel, a committee formed by village residents
to support the rejection of the school district.
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religion-no matter what the religion-must be stopped.56  Some Jews may also support
this conception of separation apart from its instrumental value to Jewish communities,
simply seeing  it as a principled  opposition  to state-sponsored  or even  state-favored
religion.
This conception of a strict separation between church and state underlies the decision
of the state trial court in Grumet v. New York State Education Department." The trial
court held that the state statute creating the special district violated the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution. The appellate court affirmed, as did the highest
court of the  state.5 "  The  majority  reasoned  that  the  statute  created  an  unacceptable
symbolic union  of church and state,  implying endorsement  of Satmar Hasidim."  The
chiefjudge of  New York's highest court is herself an Orthodox Jew; Chief Judge Judith
Kaye wrote a concurrence rejecting the school district as too broad a measure to address
the specific  issue of the requirement to separate  church  and state because  the statute
created a special school district rather than simply a local school.6
The United States Supreme Court agreed, though it could not agree on its reasoning.6t
There  are several opinions  and  there  is a vigorous  dissent. A majority joined  Justice
Souter in  concluding that the special  school  district gave too  much authority  over a
secular function of  society to a religious group, and unconstitutionally  delegated a secular
function  to a religious  body.  Justice  Kennedy's  opinion,  in  contrast,  analogizes  the
problem to recent disputes about apportioning voting districts along racial lines.62  This
opinion reasoned that the special school district just looks too artificial, too carved out,
to be neutral toward religion.
56.  Along these lines, most Jews have traditionally opposed the introduction of prayer in public schools on the
theory that it will not be Jewish prayer said there, whether implicitly or  explicitly, and instead will be a boost to the
majority religions. As Shakespeare told us, however, misery makes strange bedfellows;  so does politics. Thus, some Jews
join with the Christian fundamentalists to oppose a Supreme Court perceived  as hostile to religion. Such coalitions were
needed to get Congress to adopt the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 42 U.S.C.  §§ 2000bb-2000bb(4) (Supp. V  1993).
Fundamentalist  Christians have also  solicited support from Jewish groups for their proposals to permit prayer in public,
schools  and more generally enlarge the role of religion in public life. See, e.g., Mona Charen, A Wise Effort to Unite
Christians  andJews,  TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 10, 1995, at 7; Clifford D. May, Separation  NeedNot Mean Alienation, ROCKY
MOUNTAiNNEws,  Apr. 9, 1995,  mailable  in 1995 WL 3186479; Steve Rabey, Some Conservative  Jews Join  Hands  with
Religious Right,  DALLAS MORNING NEWS,  Feb. 18,  1995, at IG.
57.  579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 592 N.Y.S.2d  123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), aff'd inpart, 618 N.E.2d
94 (N.Y.), cert. granted,  114 S. Ct. 544 (1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2481  (1994).
58.  The appellate division affirmed on both state and federal constitutional grounds. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). The highest state court affirmed on the federal
question while reserving the state constitutional issue. Grumet v. Board of  Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993).
59.  KiryasJoel,  618 N.E.2d at 100.
60.  Id. at 102 (Kaye, CJ., concurring).
61.  Justice Souter delivered the opinion of  the Court, maintaining that (1) there is no assurance that another religious
community seeking a special  district would obtain one from the legislature, and (2) this accommodation of religion crossed
the border into unacceptable establishment which could be avoided by other measures. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,  114 S. Ct. 2481,  2491-95 (1994).  Three Justicesjoined Justice Souter's additional theory
that the state's delegation of authority to a group defined by its common religion produced an impermissible fusion of
governmental  and religious functions. Id.  at 2487-90. Justices Blackmun,  Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy  each wrote
separate concurring opinions.
None of the Justices explored another twist in the case, perhaps because it is so complicated. Consider parsing the
federal law concerning the rights of disabled children whose parents opt, as the Constitution permits, for private schooling.
Federal law specifically requires states to assure that special education and related services are extended to children placed
by their parents in private schools. BONNIE P. TUCKER, FEDERAL DISABILnY  LAW: IN A  NuTSHELL 334 (1994).  But who
is to pay for this: the parents or the public? This is an issue still in dispute in the courts. Id. at 337-38.  If the private schools
are religious,  may parents obtain public support for the education and related  services needed by their children  with
disabilities? The parents here could not afford private tutoring. Petitioner's Brief at 23, KiryasJoel  (No. 93-517).
62.  KiryasJoel,  114 S.  Ct. at 2504-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Concurring,  but  writing  only  for  herself, Justice  O'Connor  worried  about  the
appearance of a legislature that favored one religious group over other groups.'  She used
her concurrence to  suggest ways to provide  permissible accommodations,  including a
general statute permitting groups such  as the Satmar to apply for permission to set up
independent school districts."  She also called for reconsideration of prior Supreme Court
cases forbidding public special education services on the sites of religious schools.6"  In
her view, such public services would be a permissible accommodation of religion. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsbtlrg,  objected to shielding of
the Satmar children from secular influences."
Justice  Scalia wrote an impassioned  dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas.67  Anyone who knows me knows this is not my crowd. But I think the
dissenters rightly argued that the rest of the Court in this case was overly suspicious of
or even opposed to religion. The dissent reasoned that the state of New York came up
with  a  reasonable  accommodation  for  a  special  case.  Nothing  in  the  record  or  in
experience suggests that the State would refrain from accommodating  another religious
group that asked for it. While one might worry about the unequal access to the power
necessary to mobilize sufficient  legislative support for such a special statute, it would be
wrong  to  assume that  the  legislature  acted with  unacceptable  favoritism  toward the
Satmar  and  would  disfavor  another  religious  group's  request  for  a  similar
accommodation.
The immediate  response of the New York  legislature  was to  adopt new legislation
encompassing something like the Kiryas Joel special district into a statute that looks more
general  and more  neutral. 6"  New  York  thus took up  the suggestions  in  some  of the
Justices'  opinions to avoid an appearance of favoritism by changing the form, but not the
substance, of the law authorizing the Kiryas Joel school district.
This new  statute has  already  been  challenged  in  court;  the trial  court rejected the
plaintiffs'  request for a preliminary injunction.69  Therefore, the school is still operating
while  the lawsuit proceeds. 7  The challengers  claim that the requirements  of the new
statute make it useful in practice only to the Village of Kiryas Joel; the state claims that
many other municipalities could comply.7' This is a hard one to call.
63.  Id.  at 2495-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring  in part and concurring in the judgment).
64.  Id.  at 2498.
65.  Id.
66.  Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67.  Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68.  Act of  July  6,  1994, ch.  241,  1994 N.Y. Laws 827. The statute directs  that any municipality located wholly
within but not coterminous with a single large school district can organize a new school district if  certain conditions are
met. Those  conditions include: regulation of both absolute student enrollment (minimum 2000) and the reduction from
the preexisting school system (no more than 60%), assurance that the creation of the new district will not produce a school
system  (the new one or the remains of the old one) with per pupil expenditures  below the statewide average, and required
approval  by a majority of the requesting municipality and a majority of the preexisting school board. ld The legislature
also adopted an Act that abolished the Kiryas Joel Village School District but ensured continuing operation of its school
until consolidated with or replaced by a new or existing school district. Act of  July 6, 1994, ch. 279,  1994 N.Y. Laws  888.
69.  Grumet v. Cuomo, 617 N.Y.S.2d 620, 632 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
70.  Telephone Interview  with Nathan Lewin, supra  note 52;see also Grumet, 617  N.Y.S.2d  at 632 (denying
temporary restraining  order to enjoin the funding and further operation  of the Kiryas Joel Union Free School District
pending results from the new lawsuit). The trial court read the Supreme Court's decision to permit Kiryas Joel to form its
own school district "provided  that it results from enabling general legislation that is based on neutral and non-religious
criteria. This would dissolve the impermissible fusion of govemment and religion" under the prior authorizing legislation.
Id at 625. "Facially at least the conditions established by the Legislature for the creation of  new school districts ...  are
religion-neutral, reasonable, and appropriate,  and effectuate a legitimate state function."  Id at 627.
71.  Grumet, 617 N.Y.S.2d  at 626; Telephone Interview with Nathan Lewin, supra  note 52.
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The problem of the Kiryas Joel School District can be discussed as an example of the
narrow,  or  nonexistent,  distance  between  the  constitutional  command  to  avoid
establishing or favoring religion and the constitutional command  to protect religious
liberty.  As  many  observers  note,  government  efforts  to  accommodate  religious
individuals run the risk of looking like favoritism or preference for religion.
72 The case
could also be examined in terms of the relative power of different groups in legislative
politics. The judicial response might be defended as an effort to restrict unfair advantages
secured by a group when similar advantages have not-or have not yet-been secured by
others.7
But the historical narrative I have offered locates this case in the broader context of the
subgroup  question. Does the legal order extend support to subgroups or force them to
choose between separatism  and assimilation? The Supreme Court's decision in Kiryas
Joel fits  the  second  alternative.  The  community  is  told  that  it  must  choose  either
separatism-and refrain  from exercising  the statutory  right to  public support for the
education of children with disabilities-or  else pursue greater contact with the larger
society  than its use of a secular,  special,  local school  district receiving  only  Satmar
children.
74  The case suggests what the subcommunity must give up to enjoy the rights
extended to others.
7 5
Justice Stevens'  opinion was the most explicit in this regard. He said that the separate
school system wrongly shields the disabled children from association with their neighbors
and thereby  gives "official  support to cement the attachment of young adherents  to a
particular faith."'76  Justice Scalia understandably, though sarcastically,  responded in the
dissent, "[s]o  much  for family values. If the constitution forbids any state action that
72.  See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP.  Cr. REV. 1, 4; Michael W.  McConnell,
Accommodation of  Religion:  An Update and  Response to the Critics,  60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685,716 (1992); supra  note
43.
73.  This argument, while similar to an.Establishment Clause argument, also mirrors some equal protection analysis.
See generally  MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,  AND AMERICAN LAW 41-48
(1990)  (drawing parallels between equal protection and religious protection issues).
The afgument more basically proceeds with this line of reasoning: At its core, our Constitution is a document against
the domination of  any religious groups by others or by nonreligion, against the domination of the individual by the state,
and, perhaps, also against the domination of  the states by the federal goverment. Legislative favoritism toward any one
group is suspect. At the same time, neutrality  is a mistaken way to articulate these goals, for the state is inevitably
preferring one position among the entire possible range in evaluating claims of domination, inequality, or disadvantage.
Therefore,  the judiciary is charged with the important task of  monitoring the legislative results to assure that no group
systematically prevails  over others.
This  line of analysis  is not especially easy to apply.  Indeed, consider the difficulty  of comparing the power and
privileges of the Salmar Hasidic community, American  Jews in general, and children with disabilities to resolve  the
challenge to the Kiryas Joel School District. At the same time, the analysis renders explicit the goals of a liberal state in
a pluralist society.
74.  It is not entirely clear that "choice" is the right concept here, if  members of a community like the Satmar feel
compelled by, rather than "choosing,"  their way of  life. Yet choice is a constant framework for analysis  in United States
law and culture,  and one that even  fundamentalist religious groups  deploy when it is helpful  to them. Thus,  a third
altemative that many, including many religious leaders, endorse would be vouchers which would permit parents to select
their own preferred school. The separation of church and state question would arise with vouchers if the parent selected
a religious school. Efforts to construct a constitutional voucher scheme are underway in many parts of the country. For
a review of  the arguments, see James B. Egie, The Constitutional  Implications  of  School Choice, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 459,
495.
75. Perhaps, as Robert Cover has suggested, the state's interest in social control threatens and at times even destroys
the meanings created by subcommunities.  ROBERT COVER, Nomos andNarrative,  in NARRATIVE,  VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE  ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 109-13 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
76.  Board  of Educ. of Kiryas  Joel Village Sch.  Dist. v. Grumet,  114  S.  Ct. 2481,  2495  (1994)  (Stevens, J.,
concurring).  This was consistent with Justice  Stevens' view expressed in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.  38, 50-55 (1985),
that protection ofindividuals'-here, the schoolchildren's-freedom  of conscienc  is the central  focus of all the clauses
of the First Amendment.
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incidentally helps parents to raise their children in their own religious faith," this is a
"manifesto  of secularism" and "hostility to religion." "
The answer the Constitution gives to the subgroup question hangs very much on this
exchange.  How much must the subgroup accommodate or give up to participate  in the
public  sphere  and  to  lay  claim  to  benefits  offered  to  everyone?  Special  education
entitlements are assured to every child who needs them. To get them, how much must the
Satmar parents give up?78 To suggest that the Satmar parents must choose between their
religious  ways  and  the  public  special  education  entitlement  assumes  wrongly  that
religious ways are themselves matters of choice.79  -
Michael  Sandel, the political philosopher, has commented that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence  on religion wrongly protects only religious freedom of choice rather than
religious freedom of conscience. 8  Sandel argues that the Court treats religious beliefs as
worthy of respect  because they are "the product of free and voluntary  choice."'"  As  a
result, the Court may fail to assure freedom of conscience, which he describes as religious
liberty "for those who regard themselves as claimed by religious commitments they have
not chosen."' 2  For those  who regard themselves  as claimed by religious commitments
beyond human choice, our secular constitutional order assures not neutrality but only the
offer of the benefits of citizenship for those who fit the state-condoned forms of life.
3
Consider the landmark case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 4  in which the Supreme Court granted
an exemption from compulsory school laws for the Amish community  on the grounds that
such  laws threatened  the Amish  way of life. Many  view this  as the exemplar  of our
Constitution's respect and tolerance for religious difference. 5
The historical perspective reminds us that subcommunities exist before and after the
rise of particular  nation  states.  It reminds  us to  ask not only  how  best to  design  a
legislative  or  constitutional  scheme  for  everyone,  but  also  to  consider  how
subcommunities will experience and respond to that scheme of general  design. Analysis
of  subgroups  and  the  Constitution  must  at  least  consider  the  perspective  of the
77.  Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Indeed, Justice Stevens'  argument is strikingly at odds
with the precedents assuring religious liberty of parents to raise their children in their religion. See  Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S.  158 (1944);  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
78.  To answer the question, "where are the Satmar children in this analysis?"  is no more simple than to answer all
other questions about children in a legal system that does not treat them as self-determining.  It is noteworthy that concern
for children's own choices arise more commonly when their parents are members of minority religions than in the more
common circumstances of most children. See. e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.  205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part); Prince, 321 U.S. 158.
79.  Some observers may question whether the Satmar compromised religious beliefs, for example the requirement
of sex-segregated  education,  in order to gain  public funds, but this would question  the sincerity  of their own stated
religious reasons for accepting co-education for their children with disabilities. See supra  note 54.  Such questions have
an appropriate place, but not within the workings of  the government's judiciary.
80.  Michael J. Sandel, Religious  Liberty-Freedom  of Conscience  or Freedom of Choice?, 1989 UTAHL. REV.  597,
597.
81.  Id.  at 610 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985)).
82.  Id.  People with disabilities may be the most obvious instance of people who do not choose their condition.
83.  Cf Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
84.  406 U.S. 205 (1972).
85.  See,  e.g.,  TRIBE, supra  note 43, §  14-5, at 1176 nA4. Justice Douglas worried about the failure to consult the
children in Yoder, 406 U.S.  at 241,243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part), but this attention to children's choices presumes
that asking them about their schooling preferences--or indeed, any effort to open choices for them-is costless and simply
enlarges their possibilities. From some perspectives, however, exposing them to choice undermines their conception  of
their lives as ordained, founded, or constructed by something larger than themselves.  Both alternatives give and take away
options.
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subgroup." 6  Otherwise, without thinking, we give a large part of the answer to questions
about the proper relationship between  the subgroup and the larger society; we presume
that the vantage point that matters is outside the subgroup itself." 7  From the perspective
of the Satmar community of Kiryas Joel, there is a position between complete separatism
and full  assimilation,  a-  position  requesting not just public  funding but actual public
schooling."' We can, and should, return to the perspectives of other groups-and to the
requisites of rules for everyone-after considering the vantage point of the subgroup.' 9
IV. THE INCLUSION NARRATIVE: THE STORY OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Shifting fronA the perspective of  the Satmar, one could speak of "society's" perspective,
but  I worry  that this is  so vague as to  cover up the  views of the  particular speaker.
Historical experience  suggests an important contrasting perspective that has become a
part of the  public culture,  as well as the laws of the United  States. This  is the view
advanced through specific social reform efforts to conceive of equality as inclusion.  If
inclusion is a central goal for a diverse society, the symbolic significance of the Kiryas
Joel case  is  admirable:  it  signals  disapproval  of school  systems  created  to  assure
segregation of any one group involved in public schools. As I shift now from the frame
of particulaiity  to  the  frame  of  inclusion,  I  will  explore  the  conception  of  and
commitment to inclusion as a constitutional,  legal, and political value and as a starting
point for evaluating the school district in Kiryas Joel.
Ongoing  social movements challenge  exclusion  and discrimination  on the basis of
group characteristics and seek to promote inclusion. The paradigmatic  social movement
in this country is the struggle for racial justice during both the movement to abolish
slavery in the 19th century and the civil rights movement in the 20th century. Attacking
first the  legal  structures  of slavery  and then the  segregation  laws,  the  racial justice
movement epitomizes the view that the Constitution fundamentally forbids state action
that  segregates  and  oppresses  on  the  basis  of  certain  immutable  group-based
characteristics.
9"  As the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
86. The question could be put in the form, what is good for the Jews, or more particularly, for the Satmar Hasidim,
or even more specifically, for the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel? Putting the question this way is very different than
asking what is good for the general society, or even, what are the best ways to interpret the Constitution across the range
of possible subcommunities in the society. Indeed, asking what is good for the Jews sounds like a mistake if constitutional
interpretation is  at hand, because it looks like special pleading, or a pre-liberal attachment to group membership. It  may
sound as if I do not comprehend or subscribe to the idea of a constitutional liberal state which protects individuals by not
preferring one group over others.  But I suggest that the constitutional liberal  state must consider the perspective  of
subgroups if it wishes to realize its commitments to tolerance, respect, and religious freedom. See also SOIFER, supra  note
9.
87.  I  am not suggesting that we stop after eliciting a subgroup's view and defer to it, only that this is a crucial step
in  analysis that itself  must be followed by consideration of external views. See infra part IV.
88.  The choice between separation and efforts to assimilate or at least mix with the larger community would fade
if the Court took up Justice O'Connor's suggestion to overrule its earlier precedents forbidding the provision of public
services on the site of  religious schools. Most likely, then, Kiryas Joel would dissolve its single public school and take
the public funds to provide services for children with disabilities on the sites of  the religious schools for boys and the
religious schools for girls. This would result in more separation than the solution afforded by the special school district,
and, given the arguments in Part IV,  I find it less satisfactory.
89.  For a careful argument about why a person or group should be consulted but cannot be the sole judge of their
own interests, see Elizabeth V. Spelman, On Treating  Persons  as Persons,  88 ETHICS  150 (1978).
90.  Usually those characteristics  are those viewed by the Court as "suspect classes." See TRIBE, supra  note 43, §  §
16-13 to  16-23,  at  1465-1553  (describing suspect class jurisprodence),  but at times other groups have also received
constitutional protection against segregation and oppression. See City of  Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985)  (holding that exclusion of a group home for persons with mental retardation under city ordinance breached rational
1995]INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Legal  Defense  Fund  constructed  its  brilliant  legal  strategy  to  desegregate  public
education, culminating in the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of  Education, 91 it affirmed
the  central  importance of public schools to this vision of inclusion.  Inclusion in this
context represented both a strategy and an end in itself. Thus, the phrase "green follows
white" became a shorthand for the idea that black children would most likely gain access
to equal resources  if seated next to white students  in public school classrooms.  Many
reformers also believed that integration would be good in and of itself. Moreover, many
advocates  believed  that  through  sharing  actual  day-to-day  experiences,  negative
stereotypes about others could be overcome. Despite the fact that critics charge that the
desegregation effort has either failed or was always misdirected, the inclusion vision has
become a basic national response to subgroups.
Thus, inclusion movements  for women,  for people  whose primary  language  is  not
English, and for people with disabilities have all,  to some degree,  been built upon the
movement for racial justice. Again, reformers have taken the public schools as a critical
focus. Some have  challenged the exclusion  of girls from elite public high schools and,
more generally,  all  same-sex  6ducation;  others have  fought for language programs to
render public education  accessible to people  who do not yet speak English. Test case
litigation attacked the exclusion of children with disabilities  from public education and
built the foundations for both  state and federal  legislation  assuring a free appropriate
public education  which emphasizes special  education  and related  services.92 Part of a
dramatic  social  and  legal  movement  to  bring  about  the  inclusion  of people  with
disabilities throughout the society,'  the disabilities rights movement pushes for both the
opening of mainstream institutions to people with disabilities and the renovation of those
institutions,  or for the creation of accommodating alternatives where necessary.94
Defining inclusion in public education for children with disabilities takes a different
form, however, than inclusion for racial minorities.  On the one hand, each child with a
disability, including each Satmar child in Kiryas Joel who has a disability, is entitled to
"a free appropriate  public education which  emphasizes  special  education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs." 9 5 Congress adopted this guarantee in 1975
after hearings, noting that more than half of the eight million children with disabilities
in the country were not receiving appropriate  education services and that approximately
one million were excluded entirely  from public schools.96
relationship required between regulation and its purposes). In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress
to adopt legislation to remedy invidious discrimination that may reach into private conduct, not just state action.
91.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)  (originally entitled
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of Nov. 29,  1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3,  89 Stat. 773  (1975)).
93.  This inclusion movement securedjudicial and legislative victories declaring the rights of people with disabilities
against discrimination  and exclusion, and rights  to accommodation  within employment, schools, and places of public
accommodation.  TuCKER, supra  note 61,  at 4-5.
94.  The inclusion movement yielded the most significant piece of national civil rights legislation in 30 years-the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990-which was enacted with phased-in enforcement  provisions, now in full force.
42 U.S.C.  §§ 12101-12102,  12111-12117,  12131-12134,12141-12149,  12161-12165,  12181-12189,  12201-12212  (Supp.
V 1993). Other federal disabilities rights laws include: sections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§790-797(b)
(1988 & Supp. V  1993); the Architectural  Barriers Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1988); and the 1988 amendments
to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3614a (1988).
95.  20 U.S.C.  §  1400(c).
96.  TUcKER,  supra note 61,  at 266.  The federal  law provides funds to the states following the submission ofstate
plans to meet the full educational needs of  all disabled children; the state plans in tua  must develop facilities and programs
to include specially tailored education and related services, conforming to individualized  educational programs devised
for each child. Id. at 268-77.
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At the same time, the federal  law  directs  that each child with  a disability must be
educated  in the "least restrictive environment"  appropriate to meet his or her needs.9 7
There  is  thus  tension  between  the  dual  commitments  to  assure  an  appropriate,
individually tailored  education for each child,9  and to assure that the child is educated
to  the  extent possible  in  an  inclusive  setting  affording  contact  with  other  kinds  of
children in the mainstream classroom. This creates  a presumption  in favor of integrating
children  with disabilities  into mainstream classrooms.  That presumption  is overcome,
however, if an appropriate education for the child's individual needs calls for instruction
and services in a specialized setting.9 9
These  provisions  reflect  the  struggle  to  overcome  two  kinds  of discrimination
experienced by people with disabilities-the total exclusion from opportunities  afforded
to others,  and  the failure to adjust  and alter existing opportunities  so  that those with
disabilities can take advantage  of them. Both imply a particular vision of equality. Both
also perpetuate  negative images  about people with  disabilities. Advocates  for persons
with disabilities thus argue that inclusion in mainstream institutions affords a real share
in life's opportunities while also offering the chance to alter the negative attitudes toward
people with disabilities that in turn produce exclusion,  condescension, and degradation.
Historic  struggles  for  racial  and  gender  desegregation  provide  both  analogies  and
wellsprings  of shared  purposes  and  inspirations.  It was  not by  accident  that Justice
Thurgood Marshall explicitly drew the analogy between exclusions of blacks and women
when he analyzed a city's exclusion of a group of mentally retarded people from housing
in  the  community. 00  Justice  Marshall  saw  similar  legacies  of social  isolation  that
reinforced inequalities of power, ignorance, irrational fears,  and stereotyping.'
The perspective of the inclusion movement complicates the analysis of subgroups and
of the school district of Kiryas Joel. Advocates for disability rights might criticize the
Village of Kiryas Joel for failing to provide inclusion or appropriate education  for their
disabled  children  within  their own private,  religious schools. The moral commitment
advanced  by  the inclusion  movement  demands  both inclusion and  accommodation  of
those with disabilities. The residents of Kiryas Joel diverge from these commitments  by
seeking to send their children with disabilities  outside their private school's system.' 2
Similarly,  advocates for disability rights  could criticize the Village of Kiryas Joel  for
failing to enroll  their children  with disabilities  in  a neighboring  school  which would
afford,  even in special education classes, a different experience of inclusion-inclusion
with  students  who  are  not Satmar  Hasidim.  From  the  perspective  of inclusion,  both
criticisms raise questions about the creation of a special school for Satmar children with
disabilities.
97.  Id. at 275.
98.  Such special education is not limited to the traditional classroom,  "but may be provided in  any setting, such as
a physical education classroom, at home, in a hospital, or other institution." Id. at 273.
99.  Id.  at 275-77,  316-17;  see 20  U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)  (1988  & Supp.  V  1993) (guaranteeing  the right to free,
appropriate education to children  with  disabilities). One district has emphasized that the burden is on those who would
exclude the child from  an integrated setting to establish that a segregated setting is appropriate for the child. Oberti  v.
Board of Educ. of Clementon  Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp.  1392 (D.N.J.  1991), aff'd, 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
100.  City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S.  432, 461-71  (1985) (Marshall, J.,  concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
101.  Idat  464.
102.  This raises the argument that they, as a religious community, have an obligation to care for their own.  See supra
text following note 55.
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The  first of these  criticisms  revisits  the  dilemma  facing  members  of a  religious
subgroup  seeking  the  benefits  afforded  to  other  citizens.  The  second  raises  a  new
question.  I will consider  each briefly, in turn.
Who might criticize the Satmar for failing to accommodate their disabled children in
their own religious schools? If the criticism comes from other Hasidim or Orthodox Jews,
the response may turn to religious or communal sources of ethics, family, and community
duty, beyond the expertise of outsiders. If the criticism  comes from secularists  or even
from participants  in  litigation  challenging the  legislation  creating  the special  school
district, the Satmar parents might respond that they are constitutionally protected  in their
choice of private parochial  schools, but certainly not required to send all of their children
to such schools.0 3 The choice is for the parents, not the government, to make. Especially
for severely disabled students, education and related services are not only expensive, but
also require special kinds of expertise that public schools have developed. Seeking access
to  such tailored  educational  opportunities-to  appropriate  education-is  the  central
vision  of the  federal  law.  Inclusion  is  a  goal  to  be  achieved  only  insofar  as  it  is
compatible with an appropriate education. The Satmar parents  claim only to be availing
themselves  in a public setting of public benefits that every student with disabilities  is
entitled to receive.1
0 4
But  how  can  the  villagers  of Kiryas  Joel  defend  their resistance  to allowing  their
children with  disabilities  to experience  inclusion  in  a public  school enrolling  others
besides Satmar Hasidim? 5 3  Even assuming that the appropriate education for all disabled
children involves all or much of the school day in classrooms designed  for students with
disabilities,  enrollment  in  the  neighboring  school  would  permit  contact  with  other
disabled  students  from  different  religions,  cultures,  and  backgrounds.  This  extends
beyond  the idea  of including  students  with  disabilities  in  settings  with  nondisabled
students. It taps into a broader vision of inclusion. This vision treats the public school  as
the meeting ground for the variety of groups  living in this country, and  a place to assure
equality, overcome  prejudices, and forge bonds of common  experience.'
The defenders  of the  School  District  of Kiryas  Joel  can  respond  that some of the
purposes of inclusion are met in their village district, and that other purposes may be the
ideals of some people, but not the requirements mandated by law.  Thus, the fact that the
faculty of the public school is itself ethnically and religiously heterogeneous" 7 provides
no small measure of exposure to diversity. It exposes young,  impressionable students to
role models, helpers, and mentors from backgrounds  quite different from their own.
The students all share a religion and a culture. This reflects the precisely tailored nature
of a bilingual  special education program for students who are Yiddish-speaking  as well
as disabled;  it also reflects the separated  residential  patterns of the Satmar and the non-
103.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.  205 (1972);  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
104.  In addition, as a technical legal matter, the directive to seek inclusion is placed not on parents but on the public
school system; the challenge is for the public educators to devise the proper balance between inclusion and appropriate
education in light of each child's needs.
105.  The parents also claimed that the Monroe-Woodbury  Central  School  District failed adequately to meet the
language needs and otherwise assure individualized programs for the Satmar children with disabilities. Petitioner's Brief
at 6,  Kiryav Joel (No. 93-517).
106.  See JONATHAN  MESSERLI,,HORACE  MANN: A BIOGRAPHY (1971); see also RICHARD PRATT,  THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL MOVEMENT 75-124 (1973)  (describing the ideology behind the movement for public schools as including a mix
of assimilationism, equality, and preparation forjobs as rationales).
107.  Petitioner's Brief at 28, Kiryav Joel  (No. 93-517).
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Satmar.'
tt This is not a result of decisions made within a school district sorting  only one
group  from  a  diverse  enrollment  into  segregated  special  education  classes.  Such
practices-segregating within the school students whose primary language is not English
or whose race is not white'°9--conflict directly with constitutional commitments to guard
against racial  and ethnic segregation  in the schools."
0 Furthermore, the design of special
education  programs must  always guard against  misuse of testing to treat as  disabled
nonwhites or those whose primary language is not English."'
But  where  the  homogeneity  of the  students grows  from  residential  segregation,
exclusions  stem  not  from  the  law  but  from  private  choices."'  Citizens  of a  town
incorporated  under state law have no duty to participate  in school desegregation across
town  lines.  The  Supreme  Court  itself has  refused  to  authorize  remedies  for  racial
segregation  in the schools if those remedies require crossing municipal borders absent a
showing of intentional  segregation  by the authorities  in the relevant communities."
3
Some  of us 'prefer communities  that  voluntarily  participate  in  efforts  to  overcome
residential segregation through cross-district busing and other programs. But it is another
matter altogether  to blame  the  parents of Kiryas  Joel  for failing  to pursue  regional
integration programs, especially with disabled students as the test case for such a social
experiment. Federal regulations direct that the relevant public agencies are to assure each
disabled child a placement "as close as possible to the child's home"" 
4 if that placement
is appropriate.  More fundamentally,  parents who tried the neighboring  public school
attested, and no one in the record challenged, that the children risked panic, fear, trauma,
anxiety, and distress in that setting."
'  Parents claimed that their children were ridiculed
108.  Those residential patterns could hardly be called accidental but, in this respect, the facts here do not differfrom
many other communities in which people choose, or, due to the exclusionary practices of  others, are forced to live only
with others of  the same race, same ethnicity, or same religion.
109.  The rationale of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.  483 (1954),  and its progeny has been  extended to
Mexican-American students, Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 467 F.2d 142 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert.
denied,  413 U.S. 922 (1973),  and to American Indian students, Natonabah v. Board of  Education  of  Gallup-McKinley
County School District, 355 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.M. 1973).
110.  Even ability grouping, or "tracling," cannot be used if its effect is to segregate. Smuckv. Hobson,  408 F.2d 175,
189 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,443 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. denied,  393 U.S. 801 (1968).  This
principle is consistently breached  in practice, however.
111.  See generally  SEYMOURB. SARASON &JoHNDoRisEDUcAIoNALHANDCAP,  PUBLc PolCly,  AND SOcIAL
HISTORY-ABROADENEDPERSpECTIVEONMENTALRETARDATION  (1979) (observing that the rise of  tracling coincided
with the rise in the number of immigrants).
112.  Thus there is no duty for school authorities to take action to correct racial imbalances due to housing patterns,
although school authorities may choose to do so. E. EDMUNDRE  EJR.,  THE LAW oFPUBuC EDUCATION  880-87 (4th
ed. 1994). It is difficult to estimate the number of public schools and communities largely homogeneous by religion, race,
or ethnicity due to residential segregation,  but they are not rare in the United States. Public  and private choices both
contribute to the patterns of  segregation, so, once again, individual choice does not capture the full story.
113.  Mfilliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744-45 (1974). But see Hart v. Community Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir.  1975) (expanding the court's inquiry  in school  segregation cases  to include an  evaluation of the effects of
segregated living patterns in public housing). I wouldjoin those who have criticized the Milliken decision. See, e.g., David
Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining  the Constitutional  Right of Equal Educational  Opportunity and  an Appropriate
Remedial Process,  63 B.U. L. REV.  1, 53 (1983);  Carol F. Lee, The Federal  Courts  and  the Status of  Municipalities:  A
Conceptual Challenge,  62  B.U. L. REV.  1, 57-73 (1982).  Others with similar political objectives have refrained  from
criticizingMilliken, perhaps  due to a more basic criticism of  constitutional litigation as a means to achieve racial justice.
See H.N.  Hirsch, Race and  Class,  Law andPolitics,  69 B.U. L. REV. 457,459-60 (1989)  (discussing the failure to criticize
Milliken in DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED  (1987),  and HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT NOT EQUAL (1987)).
Contrasting with Milliken, interdistrict remedies have been approved where intentional  segregation occurred due to actions
and decisions by the relevant authorities in the affected districts. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,  459 U.S. 824 (1982); Newberg Area Council,  Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied,  421 U.S. 931  (1975).
114.  34 C.F.1.  § 300.552(aX
3) (1994).
115.  Petitioner's Brief at 6-7, KiryasJoel  (No. 93-517) (summarizing affidavits and earlier case).
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for their different customs and appearances. The vision of inclusion does not and  should
not place the burden of overcoming prejudice on the backs of the most vulnerable  in the
society.  Severely disabled members of a religious minority look quite vulnerable in this
context.
The most telling criticism from the perspective of inclusion appears in Justice Stevens'
opinion in the Kiryas Joel case." 6 He writes that it cannot be that the only choices here
are to expose the disabled Hasidic children to ridicule, "'panic, fear and trauma'  in the
neighboring  public  school  system  or to  create  a  special  school  district  for them."
7
Instead, "the State could have taken steps to alleviate the children's fear by teaching their
schoolmates to be tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs.""'  Such  steps would not
risk Violating the Establishment Clause. At the same time, they would advance the larger
vision of inclusion represented by the public schools." 9
Indeed, if we doubt such steps  can be taken, then we doubt the inclusionary mission
of the public schools affecting all children with disabilities,  and indeed, all children who
seem  "different"  to  other  children. A  crucial  premise  of racial  desegregation  in the
schools as a constitutionally mandated remedy for segregation is that steps indeed can be
taken  to teach tolerance and mutual respect. The most basic of those steps is the sheer
creation of integrated settings. Psychologists have argued that when people are forced to
change behavior so that it is incongruent with their attitudes, those attitudes will change
to harmonize with the behavior.20  On this theory, integrated schools will be more likely
than segregated schools to'elicit mutual tolerance even among groups that distrust one
another.
But other steps are important to promote mutual respect in integrated'schools  settings.
One review of the literature on the efficacy of racial desegregation programs concludes
that reduction of racial prejudice  is most affected by significant contact with members of
other groups "under  conditions of equal status that emphasize  common goals  and de-
emphasize individual and intergroup competition."''  Important kinds of contact include
group  academic projects  and shared membership  on  an athletic team.2  Contact with
nondisabled children is especially important for children with disabilities if they are ever
to learn how to interact with others and find out what behaviors  are viewed as normal by
116.  Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495  (Stevens, J., concurring). It is curious that both the most powerful and most
vulnerable positions  in the case appear in Justice Stevens'  opinion: his point about the schools'  duty to prevent trauma
from inclusion and his view that the parents should not be able to shield their children from competing religious influences.
Id.  His two views are compatible because they arise from an expanded view of cosmopolitanism, or what historian David
Hollinger calls a "postethnie" conception of individual freedom to affiliate and disaffliate from groups within a democratic
society. See  DAVID A. HOLLINGER, PosTs'HNIc  AMERICA:  BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM  4 (1995).  That view is,
however, corrosive of an older conception of  American  pluralism devoted to assuring the continued vitality of existing
subgroups. See id.  at 85-100 (discussing views of Horace Kallen and other pluralists).
117.  Kiryas Joel,  114 S.  Ct. at 2495 (quoting Board of Educ. of Monroe Woodbury Ctr. Seh. Dist. v. Wieder, 527
N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988)).
118.  1d.
119.  I have proposed nearly the mirror image of Justice  Stevens'  suggestion by suggestingqlhat,  as the "magnet
school," the one located within Kiryas Joel would draw students from other communities by the strength of  its programs
and by its welcoming  stance.
120.  Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of School
Desegregation  Plans?,  12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 94-95 (1983).  But others have argued that only behaviors change, not the
prejudiced attitudes which  may underlie behavior.  John B. McConahay, Reducing Racial Prejudice in Desegregated
Schools, in EFFEcnivE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:  EQUITY, QUALITY  AND FEAslBaITY 35, 48 (Willisl). Hawley ed.,
1981).
121.  McConahay, supra  note 120, at 35.
122.  Id. Such joint activities  are more effective than  instructing teachers about race relations  and changing  the
curriculum to reflect multicultural traditions,  although such measures might also be useful. Id at 37, 44.
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other students."  Yet it also seems the case that prejudices  are more readily decreased
where  there  are  few  points  of difference  between  groups.  Prejudice  about  racial
difference, for example, may be more easily altered where there are not also social class
differences  among  the  groups. 2 4  Support  from  the  community, 25  especially  from
neighbors  and family  members,  is important  in influencing  the  attitudes  of students
toward the experience of integration.
2 6
How  much  did  the  Satmar  parents  support  their  children's  enrollment  in  the
neighboring  school  outside their  village?  Could  they alter  their  children's  negative
experiences  by supporting the integration  effort more  fully? The evidence from racial
desegregation suggests that the parents and neighbors of the non-Satmar must join in
supporting the integration effort, and the school must undertake to construct joint projects
with common purposes for students with many points of difference from one another. The
perspective afforded  by inclusion would press all the relevant actors to try to make it
work,  but  would  emphasize  the  importance  of  assuring  each  individual  child  an
appropriate educational setting.'27
Perhaps  the public  school  officials responsible for the entire state plan for special
education  should explore the possibility of expanding  the diversity of students  in the
Kiryas  Joel  school  district. This might include  secular programs for the nondisabled
Satmar children joined in common projects with the disabled children on the site of the
public school; English  language instruction and exercises  using English might provide
a  good  topic.  It  might  also  include  non-Satmar  children  with  disabilities,  where
appropriate,  in programs  at the Kiryas Joel  school.  In the record before  the Supreme
Court,  two-thirds  of the  full-time students enrolled  in  programs  at  the school reside
outside the district, but all of them are Hasidic.'2' Perhaps others from outside the district
could join in programs to the extent that the bilingual dimension of the school permits.
Indeed,  given  the  historic  tensions  between  the  Satmar  and  Lubavitch  Hasidic
communities,  an intriguing experiment  in  integration would bring Lubavitch  children
with disabilities into the Kiryas Joel public school.
Above  all,  the  commitment  to inclusion  raises questions  about  the  special  school
district. These are questions as much for the communities outside as for the community
inside Kiryas Joel.  If we  view the Satmar parents  as making a good faith request for
secular public school education, their children are entitled to it. That includes  education
in a safe environment, free from ridicule. That includes  accommodation for disabilities.
That includes  accommodation  for language  differences.  Then the public  school faces
dilemmas of integration  and segregation that pervade  schools: when should groups of
children be sorted to learn together, whether by ability, language or other traits, and when
should  integration  be the name of the  game? These are hard  questions. They require
accommodation by the state, not just by the families, to make the vision of freedom and
equality not dependent  on families giving up who they are.
123.  Robert J. Goodwin, Public  School Integration  of Children with Handicaps  After Smith v. Robinson:  "Separate
but Equal" Revisited.?, 37 ME. L. REV. 267,272 (1985).
124.  McConahay, spra  note 120, at 41.
125.  Id. at 38.
126.  Rossell, stipra  note 120,  at 99-100.
127.  Once again there is the alternative, endorsed by Justice O'Connor, ofjudicial reconsideration of  the decisions
forbidding provision ofpublicly funded services  on the site of parochial  schools. This would meet the needs of  religious
accommodation and special education programs  and services, but give up on any efforts to bridge the gap between the
religious community and other communities.
128.  Board of Educ. of  Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,2486 (1994).
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V. THE CHALLENGE TODAY
As I near a conclusion,  I hope it is clear that I care more about the questions than the
answers. Yes, I think the case of Kiryas Joel was wrongly decided, but there is already
a new lawsuit, under a new statute. The more important issues concern accommodating
the  competing  frames  of  reference  afforded  by  particular  narratives  of  subgroup
experiences and the strong commitment to inclusion as the vision of equality. In light of
these competing perspectives,  I have suggested  a challenge to the Supreme Court:  to
reinterpret  the Constitution to ask not just what people  must give for a constitutional
society, but also what the government must give.
There  is a challenge to the subgroups like the Satmars and to their neighbors: can they
pursue  a good faith  effort to work  something  out?  Would they accept a truly public
school,  in the sense of some integration during some parts of the day or week, with other
kinds of children?
29
There is a challenge to the special education  movement: to be attentive to the risks of
resegregation  in the name of an appropriate education while also being attentive to the
dangers of denying an appropriate education in the interests of keeping diverse students
together.
There is a challenge to all of us:
(a) to keep all  sides alive in these debates;
(b)  to keep vital  a liberal  state committed  to inclusion but also  one that respects
subgroup affiliations; and
(c) to keep vital subgroups that may themselves both respect and  resist the state.
Can we protect what makes us different without contributing to the misunderstandings
that grow from segregation, even  if it is voluntary segregation?
3' Can we articulate our
own perspectives  in ways that others  can understand, and also work on the project of
devising and revising a collective form of life for all groups?
We  must  each  be  alert  to  the  dangers  that  crude  notions  of  identity  support:
balkanization, fragmentation, fundamentalism,  illiberalism,  segregation, and prejudice
around  the  world.  We  must guard  against  institutionalizing  ways  of thinking  about
difference that in turn produce irreconcilable conflicts and violence.
129.  Their strict  and even  litigious adherence  to their own  traditions in all other contexts  as well as their usual
practices of staying among themselves cast such willingness into doubt. For example, members of the village engaged in
a long dispute over the state-funded bus driver assigned to transport school children  to a private  religious school. The
United Talmudic Academy,  a private religious school for boys in the Village of Kiryas Joel, objected to the assignment
of a female bus driver on the public bus provided under state law to transport the children between their homes and the
school; the boys refused to board the school bus because of a Hasidic religious practice which prohibits social  interaction
between the sexes. The school district tried to accommodate  the Hasidim by replacing the female bus driver with a male
driver out of the seniority order. The bus driver union filed and won a grievance against the district under the collective
bargaining agreement; members of the community obtained a restraining order against removing the male driver. This was
only an initial phase of a lengthy  controversy resulting in a successful sex discrimination  suit by female bus drivers.
Bollenbach v. Board of  Educ. of Monroe Woodbury Ctr. Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp. 1450  (1987).
130.  Perhaps  different considerations  arise where  the subgroup identity  is invented  as part of a larger political
struggle, as at least some observers argue is the case in Bosnia and other parts of Eastern Europe. Efforts by individuals
to claim allegiance  to an identity that has had no  meaningful dimensions for a long period of time involve a complex
process of invention and  denial  of competing  conceptions  or  multiple aspects  of identity.  Thus,  even  patterns  of
intermarriage  across religious  and ethnic  lines in Bosnia have not prevented  the assertion of distinctive  and hostile
identities by the children of such marriages.
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In this context, I invite you to consider how to approach the very live proposals for
special  public  schools  for  African-American  males  only,'3'  the  recent  litigation
challenging  a public  all-male  military academy, 32 arguments  for public  school math
classes  for girls only,  requests for bilingual  schools concentrating  on  Japanese  and
attracting large numbers of Japanese-Americans,  and calls for public vouchers to pay for
varieties  of private  and  parochial  education.  What  narratives  of particularity  and
narratives  of inclusion  can  and  should  contribute  to  public  evaluations  of these
proposals?
I offer simultaneous attention to particular stories and to the commitment to inclusion
so that we acknowledge  that each of us stands at the crossroads  between  secular and
religious  society,  between  the  vision  of political emancipation  and  the  autonomous
community  in  jeopardy  of assimilation  or  continued  exclusions,  between  subgroup
membership  and affiliation  with the larger  society.  Can we be narrators of particular
histories of specific subgroups to render the stories comprehensible to others and defend
claims for accommodation and recognition?  Can we also author the story'of inclusion and
its vision of a society open to all? Can we weave these stories together productively?
Supreme  Court  Justice  Charles  Evans  Hughes  once  wrote  that  "the  history  of
scholarship  is a record of disagreements,  and when we deal with questions relating  to
principles of law and their application, we do not suddenly rise into a stratosphere of icy
certainty."'3  I offer no icy certainty, and perhaps no answers,  but I propose some of the
questions.
131.  See, e.g.,  Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown andthe  Afrocentric Curriculum,  101 YALE LJ.  1285(1992);  Michael 3. Weber,
Immersed in an Educational  Crisis:  Alternative ProgramsforAfrican-American  Males, 45 STAN. L. REV.  1099 (1993).
132.  See Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (1995) (affirming district court's  ruling that a state run military academy,
The Citadel, cannot exclude a  qualified female candidate); United States v. Virginia., 766 F. Supp.  1407 (W.D. Va.  1991),
vacated,  976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992),  cert.  denied, 113 S.  Ct. 2431 (1993),  on remand,  852 F. Supp. 471  (W.D. Va.-
1994),  aff'd, 44 F.3d  1229 (4th Cir.  1995), petitian  for cert.filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3861  (U.S. May 26, 1995) (challenging
Virginia Military Institute's  policy excluding women). For commentary  on the case, see Robert  N. Weiner & Mark
Eckenwiler,Anns andthe Woman:  The Case  for  EqualAccess to Military  Colleges,  LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 7,  1994, at 25;
Ellen Willis, VILLAGE VOICE,  Sept. 13,  1994, at 8.
133. Charles  E. Hughes, Address of  the Chief Justice,  Honorable Charles  Evans Hughes, 13 A.L.I. PRoc. 61,  64
(1936).
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